With skirmishes erupting near the Persian Gulf and a memorandum of understanding reportedly moving toward the president’s desk, the Middle East is teetering between renewed conflict and an uneasy truce. The terms of this deal remain unclear, but according to reports, Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz for 60 days in exchange for the United States lifting its blockade and permitting certain oil sales.

This arrangement would largely serve American interests. However, negotiations over other issues—such as Iran’s remaining stockpile of enriched uranium—present significant challenges. President Trump can only secure enduring success if he avoids common pitfalls that have plagued U.S. diplomatic efforts in the past.

For many Americans and their allies, this agreement represents a bitter disappointment. They had hoped for the collapse of the Iranian regime during the conflict, but neither a coup nor widespread unrest materialized. While the supreme leader and numerous top officials did not survive the war, their loyalists now control a diminished empire.

Iran has little cause for celebration. Tehran had aimed to undermine Washington by blocking the Strait of Hormuz, but if it adheres to its commitments this time, it would surrender leverage in exchange for ending the blockade. This scenario would essentially return the Gulf region to prewar conditions, with Iran losing approximately $270 billion and facing reduced capacity to enrich uranium or develop long-range weapons.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent outlined Trump’s “several red lines” on Thursday, stating that Iran must surrender its highly enriched uranium, abandon nuclear weapon development, and ensure the Strait of Hormuz remains free and open. These objectives are worthy but will only be achieved if the United States avoids recurring diplomatic errors.

Two critical mistakes often undermine U.S. diplomacy: first, ignoring the ideologies and narratives that drive counterparts while expecting economic incentives to bridge differences; second, assuming initial agreements build goodwill for future, more substantial deals.

These blind spots contributed to the failures of two pivotal American diplomatic efforts in recent decades—the Oslo Accords and the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. The Oslo Accords provided temporary governance over disputed territory but failed to resolve the underlying conflict between Zionism and regional anti-Zionist sentiment. Similarly, the JCPOA did not lead to a new understanding between America and groups hostile to U.S. interests.

Two more effective approaches exist for diplomacy: developing a deep understanding of how other nations view their own interests and crafting options that are robust rather than superficial. When negotiating with parties whose goals oppose or ignore American interests, diplomacy should focus on changing the facts on the ground in our favor rather than fostering goodwill.

Unlike the Oslo Accords or the JCPOA, the Abraham Accords succeeded because they aligned with the broader goals of participating Arab nations. These countries viewed their fossil fuel reserves as wasted assets and sought transitions into tourism and emerging technologies. Attracting tourists and investors requires stability—a partnership with Israel provided critical benefits: Israeli military strength served as a deterrent against Iranian aggression, while technological innovation offered pathways for advancement.

The new leadership in Tehran is unlikely to abandon its core objectives—destroying Israel and harming Americans. Therefore, leveraging negotiations to secure tangible gains remains the most viable path forward. Iran had promised to reopen the Strait during the ceasefire but failed to do so, triggering a blockade. Imposing consequences for further violations will be critical.

Preventing Iran from rebuilding its military capabilities must also be addressed. The recent bombing campaign severely damaged the regime’s ability to enrich uranium or construct long-range weapons. Removing existing stockpiles of enriched uranium from Iranian control would further reduce threats. However, if sanctions relief is granted, the mullahs might use it to rebuild arsenals, risking uprisings among their impoverished and disgruntled populace.